Quick teambuilding activities for busy managers: 50 exercises that get results in just 15 . myself. I modified others from existing games and activities. The rest. PDF | Management is an art or science is debatable. But one thing which is sure is that importance of management functions, learning basic. Staff consists of 15 employees. 5 of which are of Managerial Post. My Boss has asked me to arrange Management Games to enhance unity and.
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30 Team-Building Games, Activities, and Ideas. 1. The Game of Possibilities. Time: 5–6 minutes. Purpose: To stimulate conversation, ideas, and laughter. The Management Game. Board of Directors Manual i. Welcome to the Management Game! This handbook outlines your tasks and responsibilities as a member. management games based on the specifications of different KEYWORDS: management game, management simulation, teamwork.
Asset managers 44 The main move allowed for asset managers is selecting asset rehabilitation policy. In the game two extreme policies are available. On the other hand users will not be satisfied with this policy in the short term when rehabilitation of significantly deteriorated assets is postponed in favor of moderately deteriorated ones.
AM are allowed this move in years 1 and 3 as significant changes in rehabilitation policy are not common on an annual basis Osman, The objective of AM is the maximization of long-term overall road network condition using the available budget. Road users The main move allowed for users is to complain to politicians or service providers.
At the end of each year, it is assumed that the users will either complain or not complain. Although the complaint event happens continuously over the time, in this framework, users are allowed this move at the end of years 1, 2, and 3. In the game, users aim to maximize the short-term user-oriented performance measures of the roadway. Performance measures are more comprehensive than pavement physical condition state and include indicators such as ride quality, pavement smoothness, fuel consumption, and travel times Li and Sinha, These measures are discussed in the following section.
All player moves and objectives are summarized in Table II.
Game assumptions The game assumes that bottom-up cooperation might emerge as the result of convergence of interests of players. This is used to model the framework for interaction among the main players and stakeholders of the road network asset management.
General assumptions for such a model are those used in the game theory to handle games of strategy: The game is a finite game with sequential nature, in which each player has a discrete decision space.
Although it could be argued that the deterioration process of approach infrastructure systems takes place over a much longer time span and that politicians will instinctively select to postpone infrastructure investments to future generation, the realty of infrastructure decision making is different.
For many infrastructure assets with intermediate useful lives of ten to 15 years e. Second, with the 45 majority of infrastructure systems in an already deteriorated state, the deterioration process is known to be rapid and users are already unsatisfied with the level of service being provided. Game simplification The total number of move combinations available in a game is calculated as the product of all available actions for all moves in the game: Based on the game structure described in Table II, the game is composed of eight moves and all moves have two options per move.
In order to reduce the solution space, the following simplifications were implemented to the game: The proposed simplification removed 96 move combinations and reduced the solution space to only combinations. These simplifications are shown in Table III. Player Payoffs Figure 1. Overall system framework Users performance criteria using multi-attribute utility theory.
The following sections describe these models. Markov-based optimization model A five-state Markov deterioration model is used to forecast the expected condition states of the road network taking into consideration the initial network condition as well as rehabilitation and maintenance costs.
The future condition of a road network at time i can be estimated as: The road deterioration rate will be influenced by the extent and type of rehabilitation implemented by the road agency each year.
The type and extent of rehabilitation can be described by a policy R r1, r2, r3, r4, r5 where ri represents the annual percentage of roads rehabilitated in condition state i from the entire network. As roads deteriorate, rehabilitation becomes more costly. Similarly, maintenance costs are represented by the vector M m1, m2, approach m3, m4, m5 where mi represents the cost of maintaining 1 km of road in condition state i.
The policy directive sets overall directions for rehabilitation. For example, a directive could be not to rehabilitate any segment of the road which is in condition states 1, 2 or 3 and to rehabilitate twice as many roads by percentage in condition 4 than in condition 5. This directive would add the following constraints: Road condition states are used as input to the road performance model. Road performance model In the eyes of users, the performance of a road network spans a far more diverse set of objectives than the average overall physical condition of the pavement.
Researchers have identified several performance measures for road networks that include pavement roughness, vehicle operating costs, capacity, and road safety Li and Sinha, A considerable portion of these performance indicators are directly correlated with pavement condition PCI. Chandra developed a model based on empirical data from India that relates pavement deterioration to reduction in vehicle speeds and subsequently reduction in highway traffic capacity: Values of a and b are functions of four vehicle types passenger car, small trucks, medium trucks, and articulated trucks.
The WesTrack project tested the impact of roadway roughness on the fuel consumption of heavy duty trucks Epps et al. Based on this result, a linear regression model was developed to represent the relationship between fuel consumption and road surface roughness: The final result is expressed as the difference between fuel consumed during vehicle operation on a rough overlay and on an ideally smooth overlay.
In this paper, user satisfaction with road performance is calculated based on the previous work in this regard. User satisfaction is based on three road performance measures: The following section highlights how multi-attribute utility theory is used to calculate overall player satisfaction based on road performance measures.
Multi-attribute utility model Different players in a game have multiple and sometimes different criteria to measure their overall payoff. An advantage of using utility theory is the ability to model the risk attitude of the decision maker through translating payoffs to the utility.
Utility theory has been applied to several decision-making problems that have a socio-technical dimension like collaborative negotiation Pena-Mora and Wang, , construction dispute resolution and issuing construction insurance Song et al. The development of a multi-attribute utility model needs to address: Objectives for each decision maker should reflect the real-world behavior of the player as much as possible. Three objectives have been considered here for the politicians: Asset managers are generally interested in a higher average physical condition level for the infrastructure.
In the current model, this is taken as their sole objective as a player. Users on the other hand are expected to be more concerned about what affects their day-to-day life. Fuel consumption, road roughness, and the time wasted due to the pavement deterioration are the main objectives of user players and are calculated using Equations 7 - Risk aversion can be defined as the reluctance to accept a bargain with an 49 uncertain payoff rather than another bargain with more certain, but possibly lower expected payoff.
To model such an attitude here, an exponential utility function is used, which is a common utility functions reflecting risk aversion Clemen and Reilly, Few methods are listed in the literature to assess the risk tolerance of a decision maker. R is estimated based on general guidelines from the literature and incorporation of expert judgment.
Figure 2 shows the utility function for politicians corresponded to the spending, and for users, regarding portion of the road in failing condition, as two samples among other criteria considered for these players.
For asset managers on the other hand, regarding the low range of variations for the output average condition level of the road network , risk cannot be critical and therefore, the utility function for asset managers can be considered as risk neutral linear. Illustrative example The non-cooperative game is modeled and the Markovian behavior of the infrastructure determines the payoffs for each player.
Each policy will be applied over the subsequent two years, by spending the annual budget set by the politicians. In the beginning of the third year, asset managers have the choice of either switching between the policies or applying the same policy for another term of two years.
Politicians on the other handset the annual budget for the maintenance and operation at the beginning of each year by either increasing or decreasing the previous budget to a particular percentage. During each year, users have the right to complain about the condition of the road network. Decision made by the politicians in budget allocation, and by the asset managers in policy making affects the network condition directly. Condition of the system will directly 4,1 give a measure for outcomes of the two players users and asset managers , and indirectly affects the utility of the third player politician.
In the illustrative example a road network for a small Canadian city comprised of 3, lane km is used. The reactive maintenance and rehabilitation costs at various condition states are shown in Table IV.
The baseline budget for roadwork assigned at 50 the first year is eight million dollars. Using the multi-attribute utility model final payoffs for users U and politicians P is calculated as follows: Which game best simulates the objectives and conditions I am trying to communicate What time do you have to run it?
How many participants are there? What is the knowledge and experience of the participants? What is my budget? What other courses can I use this game for? How do I run a management game? This will give you a good idea of what the game is about and how to run it Look at your learning objectives and see how they will fit into the game Make copies of the provided debrief or devise you own to suit your needs Run through the game, preferable with others, so you have a good understanding of it Prepare the layout of the room and issue the supplied materials.
Key benefits of our management games: Wide selection of business games and training materials produced by us and other top companies Best price guaranteed with help before and after your purchase Buy and use as many times as you want Easy to use — just follow the included trainer's guide Structured learning activities that are lively and fun, but focus on real, relevant workplace issues.
Playing the employee motivation game! Place the cards in order from left least important to right most important. Step Two: Discuss how change affects your motivators. Move the cards up for a positive change and down for a negative one and then look at whether you have more cards up or down.
This is a great way to help make decisions.
Step Three: Time for reflection and discussion. Talk to your teammates about which motivators are least and most important to them.